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Private, but restricted, access to databases
J. Herranz1
Abstract—We consider the primitive of restricted oblivious
transfer: the owner of a database wants to restrict the access of
users to this data according to some policy, whereas a legitimate
user wants to privately retrieve allowed parts of the data, without
letting the owner know which part of the data is being obtained.
We formally describe the protocols and required properties for
restricted oblivious transfer, and we explain how the techniques
of priced oblivious transfer [1] can be used to solve the problem in
the particular case where the family of restrictions is a weighted
threshold one. We state a conjecture on a new characterization
of these kind of families. Then we propose a generic solution for
the problem of restricted oblivious transfer, which works for any
possible monotone family of restrictions. The solution is right
now of theoretical interest only, because it uses a cryptographic
tool which has not been realized yet: cryptosystems which are
both multiplicatively and additively homomorphic.
Index Terms—Oblivious transfer, weighted threshold families,
homomorphic encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the growth of the Internet, many practical situa-tions involving operations on digital confidential data
appear constantly. On the one hand, the owner of the data
wants it to remain private against those users who do not have
the right to access it. This can be achieved by keeping the data
in a secure device, or by encrypting it. Many examples of such
confidential databases can be found in the areas of medical
analysis, electronic commerce, banking, or digital business in
general. On the other hand, some users can have the right to
access to some parts of this confidential data, because of their
role (doctors) or because they pay for it. In some situations,
these allowed users may want to keep private what part of
the data they are retrieving. Imagine the following motivating
example inspired by pay per view systems: a TV channel
over the Internet broadcasts different programs (films, sport
events...) which can be watched only by those clients who
have paid for them. A client may pay a registration fee which
gives him the right of watching five films and ten football
matches in the current month, for example. A solution for
the TV channel is to keep a private database containing one
password for each program, and then to allow the download
of the program only to those users having the corresponding
password. On the one hand, if a client has paid only to watch
films, he should have access only to the part of the database
which contains the passwords for the films. On the other hand,
when asking for a password to watch a film, maybe the client
does not want the TV channel to know which film he is going
to watch.
Summing up, there are situations where both the owner of
the data (from now on, the server) and the users who have
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access to some parts of the data (from now on, the clients) want
to preserve some kind of privacy. This problem of restricted
oblivious transfer is the one that we consider in this work. The
cryptographic primitive of standard oblivious transfer [9], [4]
ensures the privacy for the clients. It is an interactive protocol
between a server and a client: the client retrieves an item dbi,
and nothing else, from a database DB = {db1, . . . , dbN} of
secret items maintained by the server, who does not obtain
any information about the index i (chosen by the client) of
the retrieved item. Of course, such a protocol does not solve,
by itself, the problem of restricted oblivious transfer: since the
server does not know the index of the queried item, he cannot
decide if the client has the right to obtain this item or not.
Although the problem of restricted oblivious transfer is, in
our opinion, very interesting and of great importance in a
society demanding more and more privacy, it has not received
a lot of attention. The only (directly) related work is the
paper by Aiello et al. [1], where they consider and realize
the primitive of priced oblivious transfer: each item of the
database has a price, each client has a budget, and the client
can privately retrieve/buy items as long as his money balance
(which is updated by the server at the end of each execution)
remains positive.
In this paper we first describe in detail the general primitive
of restricted oblivious transfer: how to model the restrictions of
clients, by using (decreasingly) monotone families of subsets;
which are the inputs and outputs of each of the protocols; and
which are the required security properties for these protocols.
Once this is done, we explain how priced oblivious transfer
can be recovered as a particular case of this primitive, when
the family of restrictions is a weighted threshold one. However,
priced oblivious transfer is far from covering all cases of
restricted oblivious transfer, because many montone families
are not weighted threshold; to emphasize this last statement,
we state a conjecture on a new and simple characterization of
weighted threshold families.
Then we present a first solution to the general problem
of restricted oblivious transfer. It is inspired by the solution
presented in [1] to the problem of priced oblivious transfer.
However, differently than in the priced case, the general solu-
tion that we propose makes use of a very special cryptographic
tool: public key encryption schemes which are at the same
time additively and multiplicatively homomorphic. Since such
schemes are not known to exist yet, the interest of our solution
is only theoretical, right now.
a) Organization of the paper.: In Section II we recall the
concepts of homomorphic encryption, conditional disclosure
of a value, and (weighted threshold) monotone families. In
Section III we detail the primitive that we want to implement,
and we explain a particular cases of it: priced oblivious trans-
fer. We discuss our conjecture on a new characterization of
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weighted threshold families in Section IV. Then, we propose
our solution to the general problem of restricted oblivious
transfer, of theoretical interest only, in Section V. We conclude
our work in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section we recall three concepts which will appear
in the rest of the work.
A. Homomorphic Encryption
A public key encryption scheme PKE = (KG, E ,D)
consists of three probabilistic and polynomial time algorithms.
The key generation algorithm KG takes as input a security
parameter (for example, the desired length for the secret key)
and outputs a pair (sk, pk) of secret and public keys. The
encryption algorithm takes as input a plaintext m and a public
key pk, and outputs a ciphertext c = Epk(m). Finally, the
decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext and a secret
key, and gives a plaintext m = Dsk(c) as output.
Such a scheme has an homomorphic property if there exist
two operations, defined on the set of ciphertexts and plaintexts,
respectively, such that the result of operating two ciphertexts is
an encryption of the result of operating the two corresponding
plaintexts. For example, a public key cryptosystem is addi-
tively homomorphic if there exists an operation ⊕ defined
on the set of ciphertexts, such that the message encrypted in
c1⊕ c2 is m1+m2, where mi is the message encrypted in ci,
for i = 1, 2. Formally, this property is written as
Dsk
(Epk(m1)⊕ Epk(m2)) = m1 +m2.
Analogously, a cryptosystem is multiplicatively homomor-
phic if there exists an operation ⊗ defined on the set of
ciphertexts, such that Dsk
(Epk(m1)⊗Epk(m1)) = m1 ·m2, for
any pair of plaintexts (m1,m2). Of course, these definitions
make sense only if the multiplication and addition operations
are properly defined on the set of plaintexts.
ElGamal cryptosystem [5] is the classical example of mul-
tiplicatively homomorphic scheme, whereas Paillier’s one [8]
is an additively homomorphic encryption scheme. Boneh et
al. [3] proposed a public key encryption scheme which is, at
the same time, additively and multiplicatively homomorphic;
but the multiplicatively homomorphic property is satisfied
only if the product operation is applied once. Homomorphic
cryptosystems have a lot of applications, including electronic
auctions and electronic voting.
B. Conditional Disclosure of Secrets
The general conditional disclosure primitive was introduced
in [6]. In this work we are interested in the following particular
case: a server holds a secret value s, a message m and a pub-
lic key pk corresponding to some (additively homomorphic)
cryptosystem PKE. A user holds the matching secret key
sk, and a message m′. By using the conditional disclosure
primitive, the user gives Epk(m′) to the server, and he must
obtain secret s from the server if and only if the condition
m′ = m is satisfied. The server must obtain no information
about m′.
This primitive can be realized in the following way: after
receiving Epk(m′), the server takes at random an element γ
and, using the homomorphic property of PKE, computes an
encryption c of ρ = γ(m−m′)+ s. The server sends c to the
user, who can use sk to decrypt and obtain β, which is equal
to the secret s if m = m′, and is a random value otherwise.
This simple protocol solves the conditional disclosure prob-
lem in the case of a single equality between a value known
to the server and an encrypted value. The more general case
where the condition is a monotone formula with equality
leaves can be similarly solved, using the following recursive
method, as proposed in [1]. On the one hand, to realize the
conditional disclosure of secret s under condition C1∨C2, one
can run two independent instances of the protocol, one under
condition C1 and the other under condition C2. On the other
hand, to realize the conditional disclosure of secret s under
condition C1 ∧ C2, one can choose r at random and run two
independent instances of the conditional disclosure protocol,
one for secret r under condition C1, and the other for secret
s+ r under condition C2.
C. Monotone Families of Subsets
Given a set P = {p1, . . . , pn} of n elements, and a family
B ⊂ 2P of subsets of P , we say that B is (decreasingly)
monotone if B1 ∈ B and B2 ⊂ B1 imply that B2 ∈ B. This
kind of families appear very often in real life applications: any
family B which contains those subsets of people who are not
authorized to “do something” must be decreasingly monotone.
Because of the monotone property, any monotone family
B is completely defined by its basis B0, which contains the
maximal subsets of B. That is,
B0 = {B ∈ B | ∀pi /∈ B, B ∪ {pi} /∈ B}.
Analogously, given a decreasingly monotone family B, we can
consider its complementary family B¯ = {A | A /∈ B}, which
is obviously an increasingly monotone family. It is therefore
defined by its basis (B¯)0 of minimal subsets:
(B¯)0 = {A /∈ B | ∀pi ∈ A, A− {pi} ∈ B}.
A particular case of (decreasingly) monotone families are
weighted threshold ones. A family B is weighted threshold if
there exist an assignment ω : P → Z+ of positive integers,
and a positive threshold β ∈ Z+ such that
B ∈ B ⇐⇒
∑
pi∈B
ω(pi) ≤ β.
III. RESTRICTED OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER
In this section we explain in more detail the general func-
tionality of restricted oblivious transfer (phases, inputs/outputs
of the protocols, desired security properties). We then review
some particular cases of this functionality, which can be
realized quite directly by using existing results.
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A. Definitions: Functionality and Properties
Let us remember the functionality we want to implement:
a server S maintains a secret database DB = {db1, . . . , dbN}
with N entries/items, and a policy defining which subsets of
entries of the database can be available, on request, to the
different clients. A client wants his requests to be private, i.e.
the server should not obtain any information about the item(s)
that the client is requesting. The server wants to be sure that
a client C will not obtain any information about items of the
database which are not allowed to C. In general, a solution
fulfilling this functionality will consist of two protocols:
• 1st protocol: defining rights. This phase should be
run off-line, maybe before the specific values of the
entries {dbi}1≤i≤N of the database are defined. Let
I = {1, 2, . . . , N} denote the set of indices of the items
in the database. For a particular client C, the server S
specifies the family BC ⊂ 2I of subsets of items that
client C is allowed to obtain. Of course, BC must be a
decreasingly monotone family: if B1 ∈ BC is allowed,
and B2 ⊂ B1, then B2 ∈ BC is allowed, as well. The
family BC is known by both S and C. The server S
stores an information infoC related to C, which initially
contains BC and which is updated by S each time C
requests an item of the database. Possibly, the client C
receives some additional information αC from S, to be
used in the future requests.
• 2nd protocol: request and retrieval. The input for the
client C includes αC and the index i corresponding to the
entry dbi he wants to retrieve from the database. The input
for the server consists of the database DB and infoC .
At the end of the protocol, S must update his information
infoC , and C obtains a value outi. Assume that this is
the t-th time that C executes this protocol with S, and
that previous executions had inputs i1, . . . , it−1. Let us
define the subset of indices B = {i1, . . . , it−1, i}. Then
C obtains the desired value, i.e. outi = dbi, if and only
if B ∈ BC .
A scheme for this functionality of restricted oblivious trans-
fer will be considered valid if it satisfies some requirements.
Assume that the t-th execution of the protocol has input
(it, αC) for C, where it ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The first requirement
is a typical correctness one: if the client and the server behave
honestly during the t-th execution and if {i1, . . . , it} ∈ BC ,
then outit = dbit is the secret output of C. Additionally, two
privacy properties are required.
• Privacy for the client. In any execution of the protocol
for request and retrieval of an item, the server S does not
obtain any information about the index i in the input of
the client.
• Privacy for the server. In the t-th execution of the
‘request and retrieval’ protocol, with input (it, αC), the
client C
– does not obtain any information about items db`, for
` 6= it; and
– does not obtain any information about item dbit , if
{i1, . . . , it} /∈ BC .
B. A Particular Case: Priced Oblivious Transfer
When the family BC ⊂ 2I is a weighted threshold family,
which means that there exist a threshold β and an assignment
of positive weights ω : I → Z+ such that
BC = {B ⊂ I s.t.
∑
i∈B
ω(i) ≤ β},
then we recover priced oblivious transfer [1], where elements
of the database are supposed to be objects (or goods) with a
price, and users have different budgets to privately buy goods.
In the solution given in [1], the prices of the objects are
the same for all the users/buyers. But their solution can be
applied in general to the restricted oblivious transfer problem
where each user can have different restrictions (not only the
budget), as long as all the restriction families BC are weighted
threshold.
Namely, assume that the restrictions of a client are described
by a weighted threshold family BC , which is realized by a
threshold β and an assignment of weights ω : I → Z+. All
this information is known by both the client and the server.
We present a brief sketch of how the basic solution proposed
in [1] would work.
• All the weights are assumed to be different (if necessary,
by scaling them and the threshold with a large enough
factor): ω(i) 6= ω(j), if i 6= j.
• The client generates a pair of secret/public keys (sk, pk)
for an additively homomorphic cryptosystem; encryption
is denoted as c = Epk(m).
• The server encrypts c = Epk(β).
• If the client wants to retrieve element dbi, he sends
c˜ = Epk(ω(i)) to the server, along with a (cryptographic)
proof that the value encrypted in c is greater or equal
than the value encrypted in c˜. The client adds a standard
oblivious transfer query for the index i.
• The server verifies that the validity proof is correct. If
so, he answers the standard oblivious transfer query, and
updates c = c ª c˜ = Epk(β − ω(i)), for possible future
executions of the protocol with the same client.
• The client recovers dbi using the last step of the oblivious
transfer protocol, and updates β = β−ω(i) and c = cªc˜.
This solution forces the server to store a lot of different
information (the threshold β, the assignment of weights ω, the
ciphertext c) for each client. This drawback, as well as some of
the techniques used in the priced oblivious transfer protocols
of [1], will appear in the generic solution to the problem of
restricted oblivious transfer that we present in next section.
IV. CHARACTERIZING WEIGHTED THRESHOLD FAMILIES?
In order to see that priced oblivious transfer is quite far from
solving all the cases of restricted oblivious transfer, we want
to show that there are many decreasingly monotone families
which are not weighted threshold. Recall that a decreasingly
monotone family B ⊂ 2P , where P = {p1, . . . , pn}, is
weighted threshold if there exist a positive integer β and an
assignment of weights ω : P → Z+ such that B ∈ B if and
only if
∑
pi∈B
ω(pi) ≤ β.
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Notation. Given an assignment of weights ω : P → Z+,
we will use the following notation, for simplicity: ωi = ω(pi),
for any element pi ∈ P; and ωB =
∑
pi∈B
ω(pi), for any subset
B ⊂ P .
For example, consider the set P = {p1, p2, p3, p4}
and the family B defined by its basis B0 =
{{p1, p2}, {p2, p3}, {p3, p4}}. This family cannot be weighted
threshold; in effect, if suitable ω and β existed, then we
would have ω2 < ω3, on the one hand, because {p1, p2} ∈ B
and {p1, p3} /∈ B. On the other hand, since {p3, p4} ∈ B and
{p2, p4} /∈ B, we would have ω3 < ω2; a contradiction.
Our conjecture is that the existence of four such subsets
R,S, U, Y (in the example, R = {p1}, S = {p4}, U =
{p2}, Y = {p3}) is a sufficient and necessary condition to
ensure that a family is not weighted threshold.
Conjecture 1: A decreasingly monotone family B ⊂ 2P is
a weighted threshold one if, and only if, there do not exist
subsets R,S, U, Y ⊂ P such that
(i) R ∩ U = S ∩ Y = ∅;
(ii) R ∪ U ∈ B, R ∪ Y /∈ B;
(iii) S ∪ U /∈ B, S ∪ Y ∈ B.
There is an implication, necessity, which is easy to prove.
Before doing this, however, we have to note that the given
condition on R,S, U, Y is equivalent to a similar one, which
is obtained by adding an additional requirement (iv) R∩Y =
S∩U = ∅. In effect, if there exist R,S, U, Y satisfying (i), (ii)
and (iii) in the conjecture, then we can define R′ = R−(R∩Y )
and S′ = S−(S∩U), and then the tuple (R′, S′, U, Y ) satisfies
(i)-(iv).
Necessity
Assume that B is a weighted threshold family realized by
an assignment ω : P → Z+ and a threshold β ∈ Z+. Assume
then, to the contrary, that there exist subsets R,S, U, Y ⊂ P
satisfying (i)-(iii) or, equivalently, satisfying (i)-(iv). On the
one hand, R∪U ∈ B and R∪Y /∈ B, combined with R∩U =
R ∩ Y = ∅, imply ωU < ωY . On the other hand, S ∪ U /∈
B and S ∪ Y ∈ B, combined with S ∩ U = S ∩ Y = ∅,
imply ωU > ωY . Therefore, we would have a contradiction;
we conclude that such subsets R,S, U, Y cannot exist.
Sufficiency
Right now, we have not been able either to prove or
to disprove the sufficiency implication in general. For the
particular case of families B of rank 2 (where subsets in B have
at most two elements), however, we have been able to prove
our conjecture, by proving that our condition on R,S, U, Y
is equivalent to a known characterization of rank 2 weighted
threshold families, given in [7]
We think that it is worth to study our conjecture in detail,
if possible by validating it with a formal proof. The resulting
characterization of weighted theshold families would be very
interesting, due to its simplicity. In particular, it would lead to
simpler results for some particular families (bipartite families,
rank 2 families), for example in the area of secret sharing [10],
[2].
V. A GENERIC SOLUTION FOR RESTRICTED OBLIVIOUS
TRANSFER
The previous section shows that there are many monotone
families which are not weighted threshold ones. Therefore, if
the family BC of restrictions of a client to access a database
is such a non-weighted threshold family, the ideas of priced
oblivious transfer cannot be used to implement restricted
oblivious transfer.
We propose in this section a first generic solution which
works for any possible family BC of restrictions. It can be seen
as a generalization of the protocols in [1] for priced oblivious
transfer. Unfortunately, the solution is, at the current time, of
theoretical interest only, because it employs a cryptographic
tool which has not been realized yet: cryptosystems which
are both multiplicatively and additively homomorphic. Let
us assume, anyway, the existence of such a cryptosystem,
PKE = (KG, E ,D), with operations ⊗ and ⊕ defined on the
set of ciphertexts, satisfying for any two plaintexts m1,m2:
Dsk
(Epk(m1)⊗ Epk(m2)) = m1 ·m2, and
Dsk
(Epk(m1)⊕ Epk(m2)) = m1 +m2.
The two protocols of the generic solution that we propose
work as follows.
b) 1st protocol: defining rights.: Let BC =
{B1, B2, . . . , Bs} ⊂ 2I be the family of subsets of
indices expressing the collections of items that client C is
allowed to query, where I = {1, 2, . . . , N}. In general, we
will have Bj = {ij,1, ij,2, . . . , ij,nj} ⊂ I. We represent each
of these subsets Bj with its incidence vector, a length N
binary vector ~bj = (b
(j)
1 , b
(j)
2 , . . . , b
(j)
N ) ∈ {0, 1}N , such that
b
(j)
i = 1 if and only if i ∈ Bj , for i = 1, 2, . . . , N . For
simplicity of notation, we will sometimes skip the super-index
(j), when it is clear from the context.
The client generates a pair of keys (pk, sk)← KG(1k) for
the homomorphic cryptosystem PKE, and publishes pk. The
server computes an encryption of BC , by encrypting all the
vectors ~bj coordinate-wise. In other words, he computes ~cj =
(Epk(b(j)1 ), . . . , Epk(b(j)N )), for j = 1, . . . , s. He also chooses
a value u0. Initially, he sets infoC = (pk, u0, {~cj}j=1,...,s).
c) 2nd protocol: request and retrieval.: We assume
that dbi are non-negative integer values. If the client wants
to retrieve the item dbi, then he must encrypt the vector
~e = (e1, . . . , eN ) ∈ {0, 1}N , which has a 1 in the i-th
position, ei = 1, and a 0 everywhere else, e` = 0, ∀` 6= i.
The result is a vector of ciphertexts ~c = (c1, c2, . . . , cN ) =( Epk(e1), . . . , Epk(eN ) ). If the client has behaved honestly,
then the value
c˜ =
N⊕
`=1
(db`)c`
is an encryption of dbi, due to the (additively) homomorphic
properties of the scheme PKE. Here (db`)c` means aplying
db` times the operation c` ⊕ c`. Now the server has to update
the access family BC , because the i-th item has been already
queried and will be released. For each subset Bj ∈ BC , the
server updates its representation vector ~bj , by replacing a 1
with a 0 in the i-th position, if b(j)i = 1 (which means that
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index i belonged to Bj) and by setting all the vector ~bj to
0, if b(j)i = 0 (which means that the client has asked for an
item which was not in Bj , and so the subset Bj must not be
considered any more). This is done via the formula
~b′j = [~bj · ~e](~bj − ~e),
where ~b′j denotes the updated version of the vector associated
to subset Bj . The server must perform this operation over
encrypted data, ~c′j = [~cj ¯ ~c](~cj − ~c); this is the point where
we need PKE to be both multiplicatively and additively
homomorphic. Furthermore, we will have to perform two
levels of products of ciphertexts, one for the ‘scalar’ product
~cj ¯ ~c, and another one to multiply the resulting ciphertext
with each component of the vector of ciphertexts (~cj − ~c).
For this reason, the scheme in [3], which allows only one level
of products of ciphertexts, cannot be used here.
Of course, we have to consider the possibility of dishonest
clients. The server will release to the client this value c˜ (an
encryption of dbi), conditioned to the fact that the query is
correct, which means that:
1) the client has behaved honestly in the previous execu-
tions of the protocol; and
2) the vector of ciphertexts ~c = (c1, . . . , cN ) contains
exactly one encryption of 1, and N − 1 encryptions of
0; and
3) the index i such that ci is an encryption of 1 still belongs
to some subset Bj ∈ BC .
The first condition is ensured with a chaining technique
[1]: in the t-th execution of the protocol, the client receives
an encryption of some value ut, if and only if the t-th query
is correct. Then, in the (t + 1)-th execution, the client must
provide an encryption of ut.
The second condition ensures that the client will obtain
at most one item, if any, and that the client cannot try to
“increase” his rights BC for the following interaction, by
defining e` = −1 for some ` ∈ {1, . . . , N}, for example. The
server will not know which entry of ~c encrypts the value 1, but
he will be convinced that ~c is well formed if the corresponding
vector ~e = (e1, . . . , eN ) of plaintexts satisfies
N∨
i=1
(
ei = 1 ∧ e` = 0, ∀` 6= i
)
.
Finally, the third condition is equivalent to verify that the
value encrypted in the scalar product ~bj · ~c is 1, for some
j ∈ {1, . . . , s}. In effect, assuming that ~e is well formed, the
scalar product of the plaintext vectors, ~bj · ~e, will be 1 if and
only if i ∈ Bj .
Putting all these pieces together, the t-th execution of this
‘request and retrieval’ protocol works as follows, for t ≥ 1.
1) To retrieve item dbi, the client computes the vector ~e =
(e1, . . . , eN ) such that ei = 1 and e` = 0, ∀` 6= i, and
encrypts it coordinate-wise, to obtain ~c = (c1, . . . , cN ),
where c` = Epk(e`), for ` = 1, . . . , N .
2) The client sends ~c and Epk(u) to the server, where u =
ut−1.
3) The server chooses at random ut, and encrypts it. He
also computes the value c˜ =
N⊕`
=1
(db`)c`.
4) By using the protocols/ideas explained in Section II-B,
the server performs a conditioned disclosure of the pair
(Epk(ut), c˜), under the condition N∨
i=1
ei = 1 ∧ N∧
`=1,` 6=i
e` = 0

∧ s∨
j=1
~bj · ~e = 1
 ∧(u = ut−1).
5) The server updates the value of the encryptions of the
vectors ~bj , for j = 1, . . . , s. Remember that the correct
update is ~bj := [~bj · ~e](~bj − ~e). Therefore, the server
updates the ciphertexts
~cj := [~cj ¯ ~c](~cj − ~c),
for j = 1, . . . , s, where (c1, . . . , cN ) ¯ (c′1, . . . , c′N ) =
(c1⊗c′1)⊕. . .⊕(cN⊗c′N ). He replaces the old values of
~cj with the new ones, in infoC , where he also replaces
ut−1 with ut.
6) If the client has always behaved honestly, he can recover
the pair (Epk(ut), c˜) and decrypt both ciphertexts with
sk, obtaining in this way ut and the desired item dbi.
Because of the security properties of the encryption scheme
and of the protocol for conditional disclosure of secrets, it
is easy to see that this protocol enjoys the required privacy
properties for restricted oblivious transfer. The server cannot
obtain any information about the index i, and the client obtains
item dbi only if he is allowed to do it.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented in this work the first solution to the
general problem of restricted oblivious transfer, which works
for any family of restrictions. Unfortunately, the proposed
solution is currently of theoretical interest only; it cannot be
implemented in practice, because it uses public key cryptosys-
tems which are at the same time additively and multiplicatively
homomorphic. Instances of such cryptosystems have not been
found yet.
As future research related to this work, we can mention
several possibilities. The first one would be to design a
public key cryptosystem with both additive and multiplicative
homomorphic properties, which would make our solution
fully implementable. The second one would be to find a
(completely) different way of solving the generic problem of
restricted oblivious transfer, which circumvents the use of non-
realized cryptographic primitives. Finally, we insist that prov-
ing or disproving our conjecture on the new characterization of
weighted threshold families would have a significant impact.
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